Month: May 2015

Iris Biometric Security Challenges and Possible Solutions

Gene Itkis, Venkat Chandar, Benjamin Fuller, Joseph Campbell, Robert Cunningham. Iris Biometric Security Challenges and Possible Solutions: For your eyes only? Using the iris as a key. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 2015.


Biometrics were originally developed for identification, such as for criminal investigations. More recently, biometrics have been also utilized for authentication. Most biometric authentication systems today match a user?s biometric reading against a stored reference template generated during enrollment. If the reading and the template are sufficiently close, the authentication is considered successful and the user is authorized to access protected resources. This binary matching approach has major inherent vulnerabilities.

Unifying Leakage Classes

Benjamin Fuller and Ariel Hamlin. Unifying Leakage Classes: Simulatable Leakage and Pseudoentropy. ICITS 2015.


Leakage-resilient cryptography builds systems that withstand partial adversary knowledge of secret state. Ideally, leakage-resilient systems withstand current and future attacks; restoring confidence in the security of implemented cryptographic systems. Understanding the relation between classes of leakage functions is an important aspect.

In this work, we consider the memory leakage model, where the leakage class contains functions over the system’s entire secret state. Standard classes include functions with bounded output length, functions that retain (pseudo)~entropy in the secret, and functions that leave the secret computationally unpredictable.

Standaert, Pereira, and Yu (Crypto, 2013) introduced a new class of leakage functions they call simulatable leakage. A leakage function is simulatable if a simulator can produce indistinguishable leakage without access to the true secret state. We extend their notion to general applications and consider two versions. For weak simulatability: the simulated leakage must be indistinguishable from the true leakage in the presence of public information. For strong simulatability, this requirement must also hold when the distinguisher has access to the true secret state. We show the following: * Weakly simulatable functions retain computational unpredictability. * Strongly simulatability functions retain pseudoentropy. * There are bounded length functions that are not weakly simulatable. * There are weakly simulatable functions that remove pseudoentropy. * There are leakage functions that retain computational unpredictability are not weakly simulatable.